Xi Jinping’s Vision
习近平的宏愿
Chasing the Chinese
dream
追逐中国梦
China’s new leader
has been quick to consolidate his power. What does he now want for his country?
新领导人短时间内巩固了自己的权力，他要把中国带往何处？
May 4th 2013 | BEIJING, The Economist
2013年5月4日 | 北京 | 经济学人
THESE have
been heady days for Chen Sisi, star of a song-and-dance group run by China’s nuclear-missile
corps. For weeks her ballad “Chinese dream” has been topping the folk-song charts.
She has performed it on state television against video backdrops of bullet
trains, jets taking off from China’s newly launched aircraft-carrier and
bucolic scenery. More than 1.1m fans follow her microblog, where she tweets
about the Chinese dream.
这几天正是陈思思——二炮文工团的歌舞明星——风头正劲的日子。几星期来，她的芭蕾舞“中国梦”一直高居民歌类舞蹈第一名。她在中央电视台演绎过“中国梦”，舞台背景是子弹头高速列车、从刚刚入列的航母上起飞的舰载机，还有一派田园风光。她在微博上发帖阐述中国梦，吸引了110多万粉丝。
Ms. Chen
is playing her part in a barrage of dream-themed propaganda unleashed by the Communist
Party. Schools have been organising Chinese-dream speaking competitions. Some have
put up “dream walls” on which students can stick notes describing their visions
of the future. Party officials have selected model dreamers to tour workplaces
and inspire others with their achievements. Academics are being encouraged to
offer “Chinese dream” research proposals. Newspapers refer to it more and more
(see chart). In December state media and government researchers, purportedly on
the basis of studies of its usage, declared “dream” the Chinese character of
the year for 2012.
这是一波由中国共产党发起的、以梦想为主题的宣传攻势，陈是其中的一份子。共产党组织学生举行中国梦演讲比赛。有的学校设立“梦之墙”，让学生在上面贴纸，写上自己的愿望。共产党官员选出几个模范人物，让他们到厂矿做巡回演讲，用他们的成就来激励他人；鼓励专家学者发表“中国梦”研究报告，报纸上也是铺天盖地的报道（详见附图）。12月，国有媒体和政府研究人员根据一项受其操控的使用频率研究报告，宣布“梦”为2012年年度汉字。
It was,
however, one very specific usage just before that December publication which
set the country dreaming. On November 29th, two weeks after his appointment as
the party’s general secretary and military commander-in-chief, Xi Jinping
visited the grandiose National Museum next to Tiananmen Square. Flanked by six
dour-looking, dark-clad
colleagues from the Politburo’s standing committee, Mr. Xi told a gaggle of
press and museum workers that the “greatest Chinese dream” was the “great
revival of the Chinese nation”.
但就在12月份刚刚提出国家梦之前，它的使用还是非常具体的。在出任党的总书记和中央军委主席之后两周的11月29日，习近平参观了天安门广场附近那个宏伟的国家博物馆。他的两边是六位一脸肃穆、着黑色装的政治局常委。习近平对一群记者和博物馆工作人员说，“最大的中国梦”就是“中华民族的伟大复兴”。
Soft place
好感
The
adoption of a personal slogan—one that conveys a sense of beyond-normal wisdom
and vision in a short, memorable and perhaps somewhat opaque phrase—has been a
rite of passage for all Chinese leaders since Mao Zedong. Mr. Xi’s “Chinese
dream” slogan is exceptional, though. Its demotic air can be read as a dig at
the stodgy catchphrases of his predecessors: the “scientific development outlook”
beloved of Hu Jintao; the even more arcane “Three Represents” cherished by Mr.
Hu’s predecessor, Jiang Zemin. It makes no allusion to ideology or party
policy. It chimes, quite
possibly deliberately, with a foreign notion—the American dream. But it is
calculated in its opacity. Previous slogans, such as Deng Xiaoping’s “reform
and opening up”, could be broadly understood in terms of policy. The dream
seems designed to inspire rather than inform.
习提出这个口号，体现了一种超常的智慧和宏愿。简而言之，这个令人难忘、也许还有点隐晦的口号，一直是毛泽东以来历届中国领导人的成年礼。但习提出的“中国梦”还是非同反响。通俗一点，可以将其解读为挖苦和嘲弄前任的那些枯燥乏味的口号：胡锦涛钟爱的“科学发展观”，甚至还有胡的前任江泽民那个引以为豪但颇为神秘的“三个代表”。中国梦并没有触及意识形态或党的政策。它套用——很可能是故意的——外国的一个概念“美国梦”，只是不够透明。之前的一些口号——比如说邓小平的“改革开放”——是可以从政策层面作广义解读的。精心设计的中国梦似乎是要激励中国人，而不是告知中国人。
The
symbolism of the setting in which Mr. Xi first gave voice to his slogan was
more telling than the words that accompanied it. The National Museum’s “Road to
Revival” exhibit is a propaganda romp through China’s history since the
mid-19th century. Its aim is to show China’s suffering at the hands of colonial
powers in the “century of humiliation” and its eventual glorious recovery under
party rule. (The millions of deaths from starvation and political strife under
Mao, and the bloody crushing of anti-government unrest under Deng, go
unremarked.) Mr. Xi’s words implied that the Chinese dream, in contrast to its
American namesake, was about something more than
middle-class material comfort. His backdrop made it clear that he was flexing
his muscles as a nationalist and as a party believer.
相比文字本身，习第一次提出中国梦的场合所具有的象征性意义更能说明问题。国家博物馆推出的“走向复兴之路”展览是一种宣传嘉年华，讲述19世纪中叶以来的中国历史。展览讲述西方列强给中国人民带来的“百年屈辱”，最后在共产党的统治下走向辉煌（毛时代死于饥饿和政治纷争、以及死于邓小平血腥镇压反政府游行的几百万人，则只字不提）。习的讲话暗示：相比美国梦，中国梦是一个超越中产阶级物质享受的梦。他的背景说明他痴迷于民族主义者的强硬和党的坚定信仰。
Since that
debut in November Mr. Xi has returned to the idea of the dream on many
occasions. In March the Chinese dream was the main subject of his acceptance
speech to the National People’s Congress, China’s parliament, on being
appointed state president. In early April, at an annual forum attended by
foreign political and business leaders on the tropical island of Hainan, Mr. Xi
said the Chinese dream would be fulfilled by the middle of the century. On the
following day the party’s propaganda chief, Liu Yunshan, ordered that the
concept of the Chinese dream be written into school textbooks to make sure that
it “enters students’ brains”.
自11月首次提出之后，习在多个场合重新构思中国梦。在3月份就任国家主席后向中国的议会——全国人民代表大会——发表的就职演说中，中国梦就是其中的重点。4月初，在一个有外国政治家和商界领袖出席的2013年“博鳌亚洲论坛”上，习宣称将在本世纪中叶之前实现中国梦。第二天，主管宣传的党内最高领导人刘云山下令在教科书中写入中国梦，保证“每个孩子心中都有中国梦”。
Mr. Xi’s
repetition of the slogan, as if rallying demoralised troops, hints at the
party’s sense that for all its stellar economic achievements, it is still
struggling to win public affection. He has been trying to address this by
talking tough on corruption (“fighting tigers and flies at the same time”) and
waging war on government extravagance (only “four dishes and a soup”). To this
end he has cultivated a man-of-the-people style; many believed a report in a
pro-Communist Hong Kong newspaper that he had taken a ride in a Beijing taxi,
until state media denied it. The dream rhetoric fits with that image.
习反复提出这个口号——就好像在重新凝聚军人的士气——似乎表明从党的层面来讲，除了令人炫目的经济成就，共产党还在努力赢得公众的热爱。他誓言反腐（“老虎苍蝇一起打”），向政府的铺张浪费宣战（只上“四菜一汤”），来达到这个目的。他成功塑造了人民主席的形象。一份亲共产党的香港报纸有一则报道，说他有一次乘坐北京的的士，许多人深信不疑。官方媒体后来否认了这篇报道。中国梦的论调非常契合这个形象。
It is also
distinctively Mr. Xi’s. The term had been used in the titles of a couple of
Chinese books in recent years. It had also been used at times in foreign
commentary on China’s rise. But it was not in common use before Mr. Xi’s trip
to the museum.
这也是习的独到之处。中国近几年出版的几本书里面提出了中国梦的概念，外媒针对中国崛起的评论里也早就用过了。但在习参观国家博物馆之前，只是零星提起。
Tales in the sand
空中楼阁
Where did
the slogan come from? Quite possibly the New York Times. Last October,
in the run up to Mr. Xi’s ascension, the Times ran a column by Thomas
Friedman entitled “China Needs Its Own Dream”. Mr. Friedman said that if Mr.
Xi’s dream for China’s emerging middle-class was just like the American dream (“a
big car, a big house and Big Macs for all”) then “another planet” would be
needed. Instead he urged Mr. Xi to come up with “a new Chinese dream that
marries people’s expectations of prosperity with a more sustainable China.”
China’s biggest-circulation newspaper,
Reference News, ran a translation.
这个口号源自何处？很可能是纽约时报。在去年10月习接班期间，纽约时报推出了托马斯·弗雷德曼（Thomas Friedman）的专栏文章“中国需要自己的梦”。文中写道，如果习只是给中国新兴的中产阶级一个类似于“美国梦”的梦想（“每家一辆车、一栋房子和一个巨无霸汉堡”），就需要“另外一个地球”来满足中国人的胃口。为此，他敦促习提出“一个新的中国梦，将人们对繁荣的预期与可持续发展相融合”。中国发行量最大的报纸参考消息推出了文章的中文版。
According
to Xinhua, a government news agency, the Chinese dream “suddenly became a hot topic
among commentators at home and abroad”. When Mr. Xi began to use the phrase, Globe,
a magazine published by Xinhua, called Mr. Xi’s Chinese-dream idea “the best
response to Friedman”. Zhang Ming of Renmin University says Mr. Xi may have
deliberately used the term as a way of improving dialogue with America, where
it would be readily understood. Mr. Xi had seen the
American dream up close, having spent a couple of weeks in 1985 with a rural
family in Iowa. (He revisited them during a trip to America last year as
leader-in-waiting.)
据官方新闻媒体新华社的报道，中国梦“突然成了海内外评论员热议的话题”。习开始提出中国梦时，新华社下属的杂志环球时报称习的中国梦是“对弗雷德曼最好的回应”。中国人民大学的张鸣（Zhang Ming）说，习可能特意提出中国梦这个概念，旨在提升与美国的对话，因为美国人很容易理解。习对美国梦有真切的体验：在1985年访美之际，他在爱荷华州的一户农家里呆了几个星期（去年以候任最高领导人的身份访美之际，他再次造访了这户人家）。
That does
not mean his musings on the dream have been designed to meet Mr. Friedman’s
appeal for more sustainable growth. Rhetorically at least, such a need was
central to party policy long before the latest slogan. Mr. Hu’s
“scientific-development outlook” was all about being greener, even if his ten
years in power saw little abatement of relentless environmental damage. Through
protests and media commentary the public is pressing Mr. Xi to clean up more
vigorously. But he has been
shy of making commitments. On November 15th, in his first speech after taking
over as general secretary, Mr. Xi mentioned “a better environment” toward the
end of a list of what he said were the public’s wishes. Better education and
more stable jobs were at the top.
这并不表示习构思中国梦是要迎合弗雷德曼先生对可持续发展的诉求。早在习最近提出这一口号之前，它就是共产党政策的核心需求了（至少有这样的表述）。胡锦涛的“科学发展观”的全部要义在于绿色发展，虽然在他当政的十年间对环境的无情破坏并未多少改观。公众借助抗议和媒体评论，促使习大力改善环境。但习一直迟疑是否要作出承诺。在11月15日就任总书记之后的第一次演讲中，习提出了一个他所说的老百姓心愿单，最后一项就是“更好的环境”（前两项是“更好的教育”和“更稳定的工作”）。
If Mr.
Xi’s Chinese dream is not Mr. Friedman’s, what is it? So far that is being left
deliberately vague. The unwritten rules of succession politics in China require
Mr. Xi to keep his policy preferences close to his chest at the beginning of
his term in office, and to stick to the guidelines laid down by his
predecessors. He is all but obliged to work towards the targets of the
five-year economic plan that was adopted under Mr. Hu in 2011 (which is strong
on the need for more environmentally friendly growth). He has to stick to the
party’s longer-term plans as well: the attainment of a “moderately well-off
society” by the time of the party’s 100th birthday in 2021 (one year
before Mr. Xi would have to retire); the creation of a “rich, strong,
democratic, civilised and harmonious socialist modern country” by 2049, the
100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist nation. (The meaning of
these words has never been made clear, but officials are explicit that
“democratic” does not involve multi-party politics.) If precedent is any guide,
Mr. Xi would not begin to start any serious tinkering with policy until a
meeting of the party’s central committee in the autumn, a year after his
assumption of power.
如果说习的中国梦不是弗雷德曼先生的中国梦，那又是什么梦呢？目前，当局故意模棱两可。中国未成文的政治继任制度，决定了习在任期刚开始时对自己的政策喜好要守口如瓶，他必须沿着前任指明的方向前进。他只能遵循2011年胡锦涛当政时通过的五年经济规划目标（该计划倡导环境友好型增长）。他还得遵循党的长期规划：到2021年中国共产党成立100周年（按计划习退位前一年）之际实现“小康社会”，到2049年共产党中国成立100周年之际建成一个“富裕、强大、民主、文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家”（这些目标从来没有明确的定义，但共产党官员明确指出“民主”之意并不包括多党政治）。如果有先例可循，习不会在当政次年秋季的中央全会之前开始严肃的政策修补。
The
vagueness of the “Chinese dream” slogan allows Mr. Xi to embrace these
inherited aims while hinting that, under his rule, change is possible. But the
lack of specificity also carries risks. It provides a space in which the
Chinese can think of their own dreams—which may not coincide with Mr. Xi’s.
Since November the term has not merely been promulgated. It has been discussed and
even argued about across the political spectrum, both in articles published by
the official media and in outpourings online. In effect, the public is defining
the dream by itself.
“中国梦”的刻意模糊，让习可以沿袭这些既定的目标，同时暗示在他的统治下可能会有变革。但刻意模糊也有风险：中国人可以有自己的梦，可能不同于习的中国梦。从11月以来，中国梦一词不只是一种宣传：在整个政治层面，无论是官方媒体发表的文章，还是如雨后春笋般的网络媒体，都在讨论（甚至是争论）中国梦。实际上，每个人都在构思自己的梦。
Nationalists
see their own dreams validated. To them the tall and portly Mr. Xi represents a
new vigour in Chinese politics after Mr. Hu’s studied greyness. His talk of
China’s revival plays to their sense that China has a rightful place at the top
of the global pecking-order.
民族主义者从中看到了自己的梦想。在他们看来，高大魁梧的习为老谋深算、单调乏味的胡锦涛之后的中国政坛注入了活力。他们说习谈论中国的复兴，让人感觉中国在全球诸强中拥有了一席之地。
In 1820,
as some historians reckon and Chinese commentators like to point out, China’s
GDP was one-third of the world total. Then the reversals of the century of
humiliation brought it low. By the 1960s, China’s GDP had dropped to just 4% of
the world total. Now it has recovered to about one-sixth of the world’s GDP—and
at least 90% of America’s—in purchasing-power parity terms, according to the
Conference Board, a business research organisation. Nationalists eagerly await
the day when China’s economy becomes once more the biggest in the world by any measure,
a day which many observers expect to dawn while Mr. Xi is still leader.
正如有些评论员津津乐道的那样，据有些历史学家推算，中国1820年的GDP占全球的1/3，但百年屈辱扭转了这一切。在20世纪60年代之前，中国的GDP下降到只占全世界的4%（现在回复到约1/6）。就购买力平价而言，至少为美国的90%（商业研究机构Conference Board的数据）。民族主义者急切地盼望有朝一日，无论从哪方面来讲中国再次成为全球第一大经济体。许多观察家认为，在习还是中国最高领导人的那一天能看到曙光。
Mr. Xi
appears anxious to secure the support of nationalists, particularly within the
armed forces, and dream-talk helps. In December, during an inspection tour of
the navy in southern China, Mr. Xi spoke of a “strong-army dream” and said that
resolutely obeying the party’s orders was the “spirit of a strong army”—a swipe
at liberals who argue that the army should be removed from the party’s direct
control. In March the army issued a circular to troops saying that the
“strongnation dream of a great revival of the Chinese people” was in effect a
“strong-army dream”.
习似乎想急切地锁定民族主义者——特别是军人——的支持，谈中国梦能够实现这个目标。在12月检阅南海舰队时，习谈到了“强军梦”，说绝对听从党的命令是“强军梦的灵魂”。这是对自由派的沉重打击，自由派主张军队应该脱离政党的直接控制。3月份，军队发布通令，说“中华民族伟大复兴的强国梦”实际上是“强军梦”。
Sound and fury
喧哗与骚动
Nationalist
hawks, especially military ones, are a constituency Mr. Xi cannot ignore. In
recent years their views have been expressed far more openly thanks to an
easing of controls on publishing by officers. Shortly after Mr. Xi first spoke
of the Chinese dream in November, the publishers of a 2010 book called “China
Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era”
rushed to bring out a new edition. The official media, happy to discuss Mr.
Friedman’s prior use of the dream notion, have made no suggestion that the book
has any connection to Mr. Xi’s slogan. But it is the most prominently displayed
work on the dream theme in a large state-owned bookshop near Tiananmen Square.
The book’s author, Liu Mingfu, a senior
colonel, argues that China should regain its position as the most powerful
nation in the world, a position it had held for a thousand years before its
humiliation.
鹰派民族主义者——特别是军人——是习不能忽视的选民。近年来，随着官方对媒体的控制力度逐渐减弱，他们可以更加公开地表达自己的观点了。2010年，有家出版社出版了一本名为“中国梦：后美国时代的大国思维和战略态势”的专著。在习11月份首次提出中国梦不久，就匆匆推出新版。乐意讨论弗雷德曼之前提出的中国梦概念的官方媒体，并没有说明这本书与习的中国梦有任何联系。但在天安门附近一家大型国有书店中，这本书摆在中国梦丛书中最显眼的位置。该书的作者刘明福（Liu Mingfu）——一位解放军大校——说中国应该恢复世界第一强国的荣耀，遭受百年屈辱之前维系了千年的帝国荣耀。
Mr. Xi prefers to avoid any public talk of surpassing American power.
During a trip to Russia in March (his first foreign excursion as president) he
said fulfilment of the Chinese dream would benefit all countries. But as Henry
Kissinger suggests in his 2011 book “On China”, Mr. Liu’s views reflect “at
least some portion of China’s institutional structure”. As tensions roil with Japan,
Vietnam and the Philippines over maritime territorial claims, the role of these
shadowy figures among China’s security policymakers is a topic of much
speculation. Mr. Xi has not been helping to clear the air (see Banyan (http://www.economist.com/news/china/21577075-aroundchinas-periphery-heat-keeps-rising-thunder-out-china)).
习尽量避免公开谈论任何超越美国的话题。在3月份访俄期间（这是他担任国家主席之后第一次外访），他说实现中国梦将惠及所有国家。但正如亨利·基辛格（Henry
Kissinger）在2011年出版的“论中国”中暗示的，刘先生的观点反映了“至少一部分中国学院派的观点”。随着中国与日本、越南和菲律宾因为海上领土主权声索导致局势动荡不安，这些幕后推手在中国的安全决策中扮演的角色引发了诸多猜疑。但习一直没有出面澄清（请参考Banyan http://www.economist.com/news/china/21577075-aroundchinas-periphery-heat-keeps-rising-thunder-out-china）。
China’s
chest-thumping has not been restricted to its neighbours. While contriving not
to mention America by name, an April white paper on defence carped about its
security “pivot” towards Asia making the situation in the region “tenser”. The
state-controlled media went further. China Daily, a Beijing newspaper,
quoted “military experts” as saying that the Chinese government had no problem
with America seeking involvement in the region’s prosperity. But China was
concerned, it said, that America’s renewed focus on its alliances in Asia
“might be aimed at China and disturb the ‘Chinese dream’ of national
rejuvenation.”
中国的空头支票不只是针对周边国家。中国努力避免提及美国，4月份发表的国防白皮书对美国重返亚太的安全“支点”战略吹毛求疵，让区内形势“更趋紧张”。北京一份受控于国家的报纸中国日报则更进一步，援引“军事专家”的话说中国不介意和美国共创地区繁荣。但文章也指出，中国担心美国重新关注亚太盟友“可能是冲着中国来的，会扰乱民族复兴的‘中国梦’”。
The white
paper was released just after John Kerry, America’s secretary of state, visited
Beijing in April. The trip was aimed at reassuring China of America’s
commitment to good relations following the re-election of Barack Obama and the
handover to Mr. Xi. “You’ve all heard of the American dream,” Mr. Kerry said in
Tokyo after leaving Beijing. “Now Beijing’s new leader has introduced what he
calls a ‘China dream’.” Mr. Kerry tried to reconcile the two by proposing that
America, China and other countries work towards a “Pacific dream” of
co-operation on issues ranging from job growth and climate change to pandemic
disease and proliferation.
在美国国务卿约翰·克里（John Kerry）4月份访问北京之后，中国随即发表了国防白皮书。克里访华是要向中国重申，美国致力于在奥巴马的第二个任期和习上台后维护良好的对华关系。“大家都听说过美国梦，”克里离开北京在东京访问时说道。“现在，北京的新领导人提出了他的‘中国梦’”，克里试图调和这两种梦。他提议，美国、中国和其他国家就创造就业机会、气候变化、大范围流行性疾病和疾病扩散等问题，共创合作共赢的“太平洋之梦”。
But this
suggestion did little to abate the two countries’ mutual wariness. The idea of
a Pacific dream, said one Chinese commentator, was an attempt to spread the
American dream into every corner of Asia in order to ensure that “America’s
dominance of this region will never pass into another’s hands”. To Chinese
nationalists that is more like a nightmare.
然而，他的构想对缓和两国之间的猜忌并没有多少作用。中国有个评论员说，美国提出太平洋之梦，是要让美国梦渗透到亚洲的每个角落，让它的盟友相信“美国将永远主导亚太，没有人能够代替”。对中国的民族主义者来说，这不啻于一场恶梦。
Although
Mr. Xi doubtless feels a need to play towards such sentiments, he probably
shares his predecessor’s wariness towards at least some of their proponents. China’s
modern history offers many examples of anti-government movements cloaked in
nationalist garb. And his dream-talk is clearly also intended for a wider
audience. While his speech in November on the Chinese dream appealed to the
nationalist cause, by March his language had turned softer. “In the end the
Chinese dream is the people’s dream,” he said at the National People’s
Congress, omitting any reference to the century of humiliation. (Around this
time the English-language media, which initially went back and forth, plumped
for “Chinese dream” over “China dream” as a translation,
thus subtly emphasising the people over the nation.) An article published by Caixin
Media, a Beijing news portal, said there was “nothing short of a
competition between the American dream and the Chinese dream”. But it said
China needed to address this by boosting its “moral appeal to others”. Doveish
voices abound in China too.
毫无疑问，习也认为需要利用这种情绪，但可能和前任一样对至少部分支持者怀有戒心。在中国近现代史中，民族主义掩盖下的反政府运动比比皆是。习提出中国梦显然也是要说给很多人听的。他11月份提出的中国梦深得民族主义者的拥戴，但3月份的语调有所软化。“中国梦说到底是人民梦，”他在全国人大上说，绝口不提上世纪的百年屈辱史（大概在这个时候，英语媒体曾在中国梦的译文“Chinese Dream”和“China Dream”之间反复过几次，最后确定用“Chinese Dream”，巧妙地强调人民高于国家的理念）。北京的新闻门户财新网（Caixin Media）有一篇文章写道“美国梦和中国梦之间无异于一场竞争”。文章还写道，中国需要提升“对他国的道德感召力”，来赢得这场竞争。鸽派的声音在中国也时有耳闻。
Playing house
过家家
By
tangentially evoking the American dream with his language, Mr. Xi may be trying
to reassure the country’s new middle-class, a constituency that could present a
powerful challenge to party rule if it becomes seriously disaffected. Officials
predict that economic growth will be slower under Mr. Xi than it was under Mr.
Hu. Mr. Xi is suggesting that this will not mean a tightening of middle-class
belts.
习用他自己的语言，粗浅地阐释美国梦。他可能是想通过这种方式，安抚本国新兴的中产阶级。这个阶层的人如果心怀不满，会严重危及共产党的统治。官员们预测，习当政期间的经济增速将低于胡温时代。习是要暗示，经济增长放缓并不意味着要勒紧中产阶级的裤腰带。
Li
Chunling, a specialist in middle-class studies at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, says that the dream of China’s wealthier middle-class members is to
live like their American counterparts (and to see them in action: hence a
surging enthusiasm for travel abroad). Mr. Xi would not want to let them down.
But Ms. Li suggests this will be hard. Among the better-off, worries about
China’s development in the coming years, including risks related to pollution
and social unrest, are prompting growing numbers to emigrate, she says.
中国社会科学院中产阶级研究专家李春玲（Li Chunling）说，中国富裕的中产阶级梦想过上美国中产阶级那样的生活（也确实是这样做的：许多中国人热衷于到国外旅游）。习不想让他们失望，但李小姐说要做到这点很难。她说富人担心中国今后几年的发展，包括环境污染和社会动荡带来的风险，促使越来越多的中国人移民海外。
Mr. Xi
will face difficulty selling the idea that China can be “rich and strong” while
remaining a one-party state. According to Zhang Qianfan, a liberal legal
scholar at Peking University, “more than three-quarters [of the Chinese] would
associate the Chinese dream with a dream of constitutionalism”.
“Constitutionalism” is the belief that the constitution—which, except in its preamble,
does not mention any role for the party itself—should have an authority that
overrides the whims of the party. In January a state-controlled newspaper, Southern
Weekend, tried to publish a new-year message entitled “The Chinese dream: a
dream of constitutionalism”. Onlywith a
division of powers, said one passage, could China become a “free and strong
country”. The article was replaced with a censored version—entitled “The
Chinese dream is nearer to us than ever before”—stripped of the original’s
comments on the importance of the constitution. Several journalists went on
strike in protest.
在维护一党专政的同时，让国人相信建成一个“富裕强大的”国家会很难。根据北京大学自由派法律专家张千帆（Zhang Qianfan）的说法，“3/4以上的（中国人）会将中国梦与宪政梦联系起来”。“宪政理念要求宪法——除了前言，并未提及政党的任何角色——应该具备一种超越政党幻想的权威。”一份受政府控制的报纸南方周末在1月份试图发表一篇名为“中国梦：宪政梦”的新年献词。其中有一段是这么写的：分权制才能成就一个“自由强大”的中国。但最后被一篇审查过的文章“从未如此真切的中国梦”取代，删除了原文中阐述宪法重要性的那段评论。好几名记者罢工以示抗议。
Mr. Xi has
spoken of the importance of the constitution, but he has not mentioned
“constitutionalism”—and
he has avoided the use of the word “free” when talking about the dream. In
unpublished remarks made during his trip to southern China in December, and
later leaked by a journalist, Mr. Xi said: “The Chinese dream is an ideal.
Communists should have a higher ideal, and that is communism.” He said the
reason for the Soviet Union’s collapse was its straying from ideological
orthodoxy. In other words, he would be no Gorbachev.
习说过宪法的重要性，但没有提到“宪政”。在谈到中国梦时，都避免使用“自由”一词。在他12月的华南之行中，有一段没有公开报道但稍后被记者泄露的谈话，他说“中国梦是一种理想，共产党员应该有更高的理想，这就是共产主义。”他说前苏联之所以奔溃是因为偏离了正统思想，他不会做戈尔巴乔夫第二。
But Mr.
Xi’s talk of a dream will always run the risk of sharpening appetites for
change. Mr. Zhang says that 150 people, many of them prominent scholars, have
signed a petition for full implementation of the constitution that he launched
last December. In late March People’s Forum, a website run by the People’s
Daily, the party’s main mouthpiece, tried to gauge public support for Mr.
Xi’s dream by carrying out an online survey. The “Chinese dream” slogan, it
said in an introduction, had “reignited hopes for the great revival of the
Chinese nation”. The page was quickly deleted after around 80% of more than
3,000 respondents replied “no” to questions such as
whether they supported one-party rule and believed in socialism.
但谈及中国梦总会有这样一种风险，即引发强烈的改革呼声。张先生说，150人——许多是著名的学者——联名请愿，要求全面落实他去年12月份提出的宪政主张。3月下旬，由共产党的主要喉舌人民日报主办的人民论坛发起了一项网上调查，试图收集公众对习提出的中国梦的支持。调查的前言写道“中国梦重燃了中华民族伟大复兴的希望之梦”。在回答诸如“是否支持一党专政和相信社会主义”之类的问题时，3,000多名应答者中约80%选择了“否”。页面随即被删除了。
According
to Ms. Chen’s rather syrupy song, the Chinese dream is “A dream of a strong
nation…a dream of a wealthy people”. Mr. Xi seems of the same opinion—and has,
as yet, been little more specific. In the absence of substance, Mr. Xi’s talk
of a dream is creating space for a lively debate over where China should be
heading. For the time being it may suit Mr. Xi to keep the course he will be
following unclear. But demands for clarity can only grow louder.
陈思思那甜美的歌声唱道“中国梦是一个强国梦…富民梦”。习似乎也是这么认为的，但迄今为止都没有过细的描述。一个没有具体含义的中国梦，将为“中国应该向哪儿去”的问题提供争议土壤。就目前来看，让一切似是而非也许对习比较有利。但要求说明白的呼声只会越来越高。
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